Context and evidence
The proposer considers practical privacy on BCH's base layer one of its highest-leverage opportunities: combine private payments with BCH's proof of work, Bitcoin-derived monetary policy and existing ecosystem, and strengthen BCH's position alongside privacy networks such as Zcash. This is the strategic ambition, not an established claim that no other chain offers similar capabilities.
The work is scattered across independent posts, repositories and demonstrations. The proposer reports breakthrough claims from CrazyDenver and a contrary position from Bastian: that PQ-ZKP may be the wrong approach and that he has evidence against its viability. Both need independent examination. Neither position is accepted as a research conclusion here.
Existing inputs include ShieldKit, the BCH FRI-STARK verifier, verifier.cash and Bastian's two Cash-Like Privacy FundMe campaigns. ShieldKit's own documentation limits it to unaudited Chipnet research and describes narrower privacy guarantees than a complete private payment system. Campaign descriptions and successful demonstrations do not establish independently verified security or delivery.
Zcash's proposed Tachyon upgrade is an alternative to study. Its roadmap separates the on-chain proof system from payment delivery, where it explores post-quantum key exchange and private information retrieval. Post-quantum privacy, post-quantum proof security and secure spending are separate requirements.
Proposed approach and scope
BCH-1 would coordinate a focused research effort with existing contributors and independent cryptographers.
- Collect the claims and artifacts. Record exact code versions, assumptions, tests and missing evidence. Invite proponents and critics to supply reproducible examples, including CrazyDenver's claims and Bastian's objections.
- Reproduce and challenge the results. Check resistance to forged proofs, actual information leakage, setup assumptions and quantum security. Measure complete transactions, proving time, verification cost and node acceptance; keep component benchmarks separate.
- Compare approaches. Examine Groth16, hash-based STARKs including Circle STARKs, and alternatives informed by Tachyon. Ask whether PQ-ZKP is viable on BCH at all, and distinguish a cryptographic obstacle from an implementation problem or a network limit. Groth16 is a non-PQ comparison, not a route to quantum-resistant proofs.
- Agree requirements before selecting a design. Define what must remain private, what an attacker can do, acceptable security assumptions and practical costs. Review proof security, note delivery, commitments and spending authorization separately.
- Develop a specification and CHIP if the findings justify a viable path. Study raising the transaction relay limit alongside the design, including propagation, resource use and denial-of-service risks. Distinguish node relay policy from consensus rules and identify which changes need each process. A larger limit cannot repair insecure cryptography.
Publish the evidence, review findings and unresolved disagreements. If no approach meets the requirements, publish that result and the conditions needed to reconsider. Implementation, audits and activation would follow a separately agreed plan; CHIP acceptance requires the normal ecosystem process.
How does this benefit Bitcoin Cash?
Strong base-layer privacy could make BCH more useful as electronic cash and give users a clearer reason to choose it. The proposer sees the potential to compete with Zcash while retaining BCH's monetary characteristics and ecosystem.
Coordinated research would let BCH support credible work, identify blockers and avoid funding a design on the strength of publicity alone. Any claim of uniqueness must be tested against other networks, including Neptune. A rigorous negative finding can save substantial development effort.
Expected outcomes and evaluation
A public evidence register; independently reproduced experiments and adversarial tests; a comparison of feasible approaches and rejected claims; and a reviewed recommendation with clear security and privacy guarantees.
For a viable approach, produce a specification, proposed CHIP scope, relay-policy findings and a costed implementation/review plan. If the evidence does not support proceeding, deliver a reasoned stop or redirect recommendation instead. Success means resolving uncertainty with inspectable evidence, not necessarily proving PQ-ZKP viable or securing CHIP acceptance.
Open questions and research needs
- Can genuinely zero-knowledge proofs remain sound against quantum attackers at costs BCH can support? What evidence supports or rules out that combination?
- What exactly is Bastian's objection, under which assumptions, and can independent reviewers reproduce it?
- Which reported breakthroughs, including CrazyDenver's, survive independent verification?
- What do ShieldKit and other BCH implementations actually hide, and which security claims remain unverified?
- Could a Tachyon-informed approach deliver useful post-quantum privacy without a post-quantum proof system? Which guarantees would remain quantum-vulnerable?
- Which constraints arise from cryptography, tooling, BCH consensus rules or relay policy? Would a higher relay limit help enough to justify its costs?
- What specification and CHIP, if any, do the results support? What should be stopped or deferred?
- How should Bastian's planned separate proposal contribute without duplicating scope or funding? Who will coordinate, independently review and accept the work, and at what cost?
Supporting artifacts
Research implementation and documented privacy limits; not an independent audit.
Declared privacy target, setup and research-profile limitations.
Implementation and reported demo versus complete verification constraints to reproduce.
Candidate implementations and measurements; leaderboard position is not a security audit.
Proposed Zcash architecture separating proof and payment-delivery work.
FundMe campaign scope; inclusion does not verify delivery.
FundMe campaign for output binding, with later privacy work described separately.
Construction to evaluate with explicit implementation and security parameters.
Comparator for evaluating claims of unique proof-of-work privacy capabilities.
Delivery plan
Milestones
Driver details: BCH-1 would coordinate existing BCH contributors and independent applied cryptographers. Agree a research lead and an independent reviewer, with relevant conflicts disclosed. Bastian plans a separate proposal; discuss how the work fits together and agree any contribution.
The four checkpoints move from gathering existing work through independent testing to a specification decision. The findings will determine whether to develop one or more CHIPs, whether relay-policy changes are needed, and what further work is required. Agree contributors, review responsibilities, dates and budget during research.
Bring together existing work and agree the research plan
Collect relevant research, code, demonstrations, claims and objections, including CrazyDenver’s reported breakthroughs and Bastian’s concerns. Define the questions and tests needed to assess them.
Delivery criteria: A dated evidence register identifies the available work, missing evidence, proposed reviewers and reproducible tests. Claims and objections are recorded accurately, with unavailable evidence clearly identified.
Independently test feasibility and alternatives
Reproduce candidate results, test resistance to forged proofs and privacy leakage, and compare conventional and post-quantum ZKP approaches alongside alternative architectures.
Delivery criteria: Publish code versions, security parameters, hardware details, complete-transaction measurements, failed tests and independent findings. Explain which limitations come from cryptography, implementation, BCH consensus rules or relay policy.
Review the proposed design and relay requirements
Use the findings to assess viable approaches and review their security, privacy and network requirements. Determine whether the design needs consensus changes, relay-policy changes, both, or neither.
Delivery criteria: Publish a reviewed specification or comparison of viable designs, with unresolved objections and relay-policy findings. Explain whether current relay limits are sufficient and, if changes are proposed, their benefits and resource, propagation and denial-of-service implications. If no candidate meets the requirements, document the blockers and what would be needed to reconsider.
Prepare any CHIPs and the next-stage plan
Where the findings support proceeding, prepare one or more draft CHIPs and any separate relay-policy proposals, together with an implementation and review plan.
Delivery criteria: Publish the resulting proposals, cost basis, review plan and remaining technical questions. If a CHIP is unnecessary, premature or unsupported by the findings, publish the recommended next steps or a reasoned stop/redirect report. CHIP acceptance and activation remain subject to the normal ecosystem process.
Research confirms the delivery plan and costs.